Robert Velarde, author of The Lion, the Witch, and the Bible (NavPress, 2005) and student in the Philosophy MA at Denver Seminary, has published an excellent introductory essay on the merits of philosophy called, "Does Philosophy Matter?" at the TrueU web page. I commend it to you.
http://www.trueu.org/dorms/stulounge/A000000292.cfm
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A quick question, as I'm always interested in the answers I get (they vary): what if the "hollow and deceptive philosophy" that Paul is speaking out against is in fact the Platonic or Neo-Aristotelian philosophy that 'historical' Christianity eventually appropriated for understanding the nature of God? How can we judge what philosophies do and do not fall under that description?
Kevin,
For starters, we could check to see whether what is valued in the philosophy is something that Scripture teaches us is valuable, like objective reason or the wisdom and character of God, or whether it is something that Scripture warns us against, like a focus on our own desires or a return to a status under the Law from which we have been freed in Christ.
No philosophy that arises in a non-Christian context is going to contain in its scope everything that the Christian knows he should value. But there are lots of philosophies that denigrate things the Christian is explicitly told to value. Fleeing from those is an excellent start.
Tim,
A good start, but I have a question (yes, I know, typical of us postmoderns ;o) ): where does scripture value "objective reason"? As far as I know the notions of "objectivity" and "reason" (in the sense of well-structured premises that lead to conclusions through "logical force") are foreign to the Bible. The scriptures value truth (but then how do we define truth?), but your mention of this sparks my interest when there are other more obvious choices.
P.S. I haven't forgotten about my promise to post something on my blog about the non-fundamental nature of logic. Just give me time.
Kevin,
Au contraire! (Yes, I know, analytic philosophers aren't supposed to know any French, either.) Scripture does underwrite the value of objective reason.
When God speaks to Job, He points out that a dispassionate consideration of the facts indicates that Job does not have standing to raise questions about the Almighty. It is no defense for Job to say, "Yes, Lord, but consider that we all view things from within our historically conditioned perspective ...!" The one perspective that matters, and the one in terms of which God rebukes both Job and his comforters, is the unconditioned perspective.
When Peter enjoins believers to be ready to give a reason for the hope within, he uses the term apologia, the term used widely for a reasoned legal defense. We know independently how such defenses were constructed -- and, bad news if you're down on reason, but it's a well-structured argument in which the premises either entail or make probable the conclusion. (I'm still trying, all these years later, to fathom the continental antipathy to the "force" of argument. Is it just an unfortunate set of psychological associations with the word "force"?)
Paul gives us a salutary example of this sort of defense when he sets forth his case before Agrippa in Acts 26. Note that Paul brings Agrippa hard up against objective facts -- "for this thing was not done in a corner."
Or consider the book of Proverbs, where a man who can render a reason is contrasted with one who is wise in his own conceit.
Robert is, of course, more than competent to defend his own remarks. And Doug's views on this subject are also well known. But these are just a few of the things to which I would appeal if asked to render a reason for the Christian value of rendering a reason.
Tim,
No, you can know French, just not the TRUE French of Deconstruction. :oP
(Please see that in the tongue-in-cheek way that it was meant.)
What exactly is the Hebrew equivalent of "dispassionate consideration of the facts"? I'm not seeing it in Job.
On Peter, that is a very bad reading of the text: the reason we are to give is Christ and him crucified, not some abstract theistic argument. Is the reason for your hope some argument for God's existence? Furthermore, "reason" is there (1 Peter 3:15) a translation from logon (or logos); apologia is used in Acts 22:1, Acts 25:16, 1 Corinthians 9:3, 2 Corinthians 7:11, Philippians 7:11 & 17, and 2 Timothy 4:16 (admittedly only in the context of Paul, which is interesting), but not by Peter. Each case would need to be examined to see if it fits within your rationalistic (philosophically speaking) interpretation. Now I'm sure you're going to say that Peter meant the Logos of ancient Greek thought?
On the other 'reasons' you give, it still needs to be established that they mean something like "objective reason," of the kind you learn in logic classes and by modernistic thinkers. Merely pointing to words that have very specific meanings within certain philosophical schools of thought (but are used less formally elsewhere) demonstrates little.
Kevin,
I do appreciate the irony that you are trying to provide cogent reasons against the idea that Scripture endorses the cogency of reasons.
You ask:
What exactly is the Hebrew equivalent of "dispassionate consideration of the facts"? I'm not seeing it in Job.
This is not a one line proof text, and it doesn't turn on the parsing of some Hebrew verb. Read through the last few chapters. God is pointing out to Job the facts about who God is (and who Job isn't). Job gets the point.
On Peter, you write:
... that is a very bad reading of the text: the reason we are to give is Christ and him crucified, not some abstract theistic argument. Is the reason for your hope some argument for God's existence?
Unfortunately for your point of view, that isn’t what Peter says. But in any event you’re trying to saddle me with a false dilemma. I did not say that Peter is advocating an “abstract theistic argument”: I believe he is enjoining people to do what Paul did in Acts 26, which hasn’t a whiff of the ontological or cosmological arguments about it but goes straight to the historical fact of the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth as public facts supported by eyewitness testimony.
You have more to say about Peter:
Furthermore, "reason" is there (1 Peter 3:15) a translation from logon (or logos); apologia is used in Acts 22:1, Acts 25:16, 1 Corinthians 9:3, 2 Corinthians 7:11, Philippians 7:11 & 17, and 2 Timothy 4:16 (admittedly only in the context of Paul, which is interesting), but not by Peter.
The first part of your claim is true: “reason” is a translation from logon. But the second part is false. Peter does indeed use the word apologia I Peter 3:15, as a look at the Greek text will confirm: Kurion de ton theon agiasate en tais kardiais humon, hetoimoi de aei pros apologian panti to aitounti humos logon peri tes en humin elpidos meta prautetos kai phobou. And this undermines the contrast you are attempting to make. Anyone who asks for a logon is to be given an apologian.
You write:
On the other 'reasons' you give, it still needs to be established that they mean something like "objective reason," of the kind you learn in logic classes and by modernistic thinkers. Merely pointing to words that have very specific meanings within certain philosophical schools of thought (but are used less formally elsewhere) demonstrates little.
I’d be curious to know what you think the author of Proverbs means when he speaks of a man who can render a reason. Surely one needn’t wedge this into a highly specific philosophical framework in order to take from it the idea of something with probative force – for otherwise, whence the contrast with the fool who is wise in his own conceit? And that is sufficient for the contrast between us, where you are inveighing against reasons that have “force” and I am all for them. What we learn in a logic class, when it’s a good class, is how to recognize such reasons and distinguish them from counterfeits. If you have not had the pleasure of taking such a course, or if your opportunity to do so was ruined by your having a bad teacher, then this is something much to be regretted.
Tim,
[Warning: This is long. Sorry.]
There is no irony there, I assure you. Reason has shown its limits on a number of occasions, for example Godel's incompleteness theorem that uses logic itself to demonstrate that logic is incomplete, Russell's Paradox that showed that set theory was incomplete using set theory, etc. It is only because I do not see logic/reason as fundamental that I am not basking in a contradiction. But that, I think, is for another time.
"This is not a one line proof text, and it doesn't turn on the parsing of some Hebrew verb."
So, even though "scripture teaches us" that "objective reason" is valuable it lacks any term that even remotely has the meaning that you assume in it? I find this claim particularly interesting given the evolution of the term "objective" where even as late as Descartes the terms "subjective" and "objective" have the exact opposite meaning that we give it today (we can thank Kant for our modern understanding).
"Read through the last few chapters. God is pointing out to Job the facts about who God is (and who Job isn't). Job gets the point."
I find it interesting that God is using narrative, not the abstract movement from premises to conclusions, to reach Job. I would also point out that God is not giving "facts about who God is" but, rather, about what God has done; it is in relation to God's acts, not his supposedly static 'being.' The large majority of the narrative rest on questions, not on positive affirmations (i.e. facts). When he does give something that looks like it might be a "fact," he is giving metaphors (the grasshopper and the hawk), not 'objective state of affairs.'
"Unfortunately for your point of view, that isn’t what Peter says. But in any event you’re trying to saddle me with a false dilemma. I did not say that Peter is advocating an “abstract theistic argument”: I believe he is enjoining people to do what Paul did in Acts 26, which hasn’t a whiff of the ontological or cosmological arguments about it but goes straight to the historical fact of the crucifixion and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth as public facts supported by eyewitness testimony."
Having just read that, Paul makes no reference to "public facts supported by eyewitness testimony," especially as it relates to the resurrection. Rather, he gives a narrative: of his growing up as a Pharisee (5), his persecution of the Christians (9-11), the appearance of Christ to him including his calling (12-18), which narrative explains why he is there before King Agrippa (20-21). I see no "public facts" that relate to the resurrection. In verses 23-24 he appeals to "the prophets and Moses" about Christ's suffering and resurrection, but he certainly doesn't refer to it as a "historical fact" that is known to the "public" because of "eyewitness testimony."
"The first part of your claim is true: “reason” is a translation from logon. But the second part is false. Peter does indeed use the word apologia I Peter 3:15, as a look at the Greek text will confirm:"
Yes, you are right; my apologies, I was focusing on the wrong part of the verse.
"Anyone who asks for a logon is to be given an apologian."
Yes, but what is the nature of that logon and apologia? Is it as some philosophers have described it, in terms of some "objective [apriori?] reason," or is it from a different Semitic understanding of the term, such as in terms of dialogue or conversation? I found an interesting article yesterday in Vigiliae Christianae Vol. 31 that showed that the earliest Latin translations of John 1:1 translated Logos as sermo--conversation, discourse--rather than verbum--word--with a spotted history after that point. Sermo also has a more ordinary feel to it, in the sense of "ordinary speech, speaking, talking and the language of conversation, as opposed to contentio" which would have the more rational/logical connotation your would endorse (164). If we were to accept the Aramaic origin of the Gospel of John, we should not be looking at the Greeks for our understanding of that term (as Raymond Brown and F.F. Bruce have both argued).
Again, I am not denying the existence of a logon and apologia, but the nature of it in early thought. I find the kind of interpretation you are given to be highly anachronistic, hence my problem with it.
"I’d be curious to know what you think the author of Proverbs means when he speaks of a man who can render a reason."
The meaning of the term ta'am in that verse seems to refer to "judgment" and even "taste" more than "reason" per se. It is a different term than that used in, for example, Isaiah 1:18. But, again, I do not see any indication of the rather modern notion of "objective reason," let alone the view that reason itself is fundamental to their worldview or mindset. Particularly telling is that this verse is speaking of the slothfulness of the man, the one that is inactive, that does not act, that does not (in the verse you are referring to) judge.
"Surely one needn’t wedge this into a highly specific philosophical framework in order to take from it the idea of something with probative force – for otherwise, whence the contrast with the fool who is wise in his own conceit? And that is sufficient for the contrast between us, where you are inveighing against reasons that have “force” and I am all for them."
Not quite: your use of "reason," especially when we add the idea of "objective" (however that is interpreted in this case), has the implication of a formal system that structures literally everything--thought, creation, possibility, etc. This is quite a step from what is a "highly specific philosophical framework" to a more 'common' notion that the scriptural authors might have used, implying as it does many metaphysical notions that are not given a voice in the scriptural text (some form of atomism, the substance/property metaphysic, the immaterial existence of properties, etc.).
As for the "force," I take this as a very complex term that includes, among other things, one's history, upbringing, inclinations, and presuppositions. Except for very few cases, what one finds 'convincing' is largely out of one's hands: things either seem to have some cogency to them or they don't, with no one seemingly able to agree on exactly what makes them so. Thus we have some very well-trained logicians who continue to argue over the cogency of certain supposedly deductive arguments (whether they be theistic or not), each continually claiming that the other 'just doesn't see' what is supposedly 'logically obvious.' 'Logical force' is, in many (perhaps most) cases, a weak force, most likely a limited abstraction from a more fundamental source of cogency.
I have no problem with you believing the above (except, of course, that I think you are wrong ;o) ), but I do have problems with these anachronistic appeals to the Bible that read into it ideas that weren't even around till the last few hundred years.
"What we learn in a logic class, when it’s a good class, is how to recognize such reasons and distinguish them from counterfeits."
And the exact nature of the 'distinguishing' has been an open debate in logic for some time, even by good analytic philosophers. For example: is logic both complete and coherent? If Godel is right, any closed system cannot be both: if it is complete then there is a claim that can be given that contradicts another claim (and you can prove anything from a contradiction); if it is coherent then there is a statement that can be given that, while true, cannot be proved within that system. We can add to this the fact that you cannot derive second order logic from first order logic and there are propositions one can make within that one cannot make in the other, and the tyrany of the logical proposition is put into question. This isn't so-called 'postmodern' stuff, but conclusions reached (or questions left unresolved) by thoroughly analytic thinkers.
"If you have not had the pleasure of taking such a course, or if your opportunity to do so was ruined by your having a bad teacher, then this is something much to be regretted."
No, I have had a few courses of that nature by very competant teachers. Though I am rusty, I haven't completely forgotten everything I've learned there. Interesting, though, that it is exactly there that I first learned about the limits of logic (see above) which further opened me up to my current understanding of the issue (yes, which is still forthcoming).
Ok, this is way too long. I'm done for now. :o)
Kevin,
You may be done but I had to comment on this. You said:
>>As far as I know the notions of "objectivity" and "reason" (in the sense of well-structured premises that lead to conclusions through "logical force") are foreign to the Bible.
If by this you mean we cannot find an explicit deductive syllogism in scripture, then you are correct. But anyone that has studied logic knows that there are many arguments which are stated implicitly. For instance, DG has a book called On Jesus. In this book he outlines numerous arguments employed by Christ that include:
-A Fortiori arguments-John 7:21-24
-Reductio Ad Absurdum arguments-Matt. 22:41-46;12:25-27
***and there are many more!
So I would say that it is in these verses listed above, and in many other places where scripture values "reason" and objectivity. For if these arguments hold any sway they must be anchored into some objective, unchanging framework.
Clint,
I just don't want to take up as much space as I did, which is hard with a topic like this that can take a lot of work to do right.
"If by this you mean we cannot find an explicit deductive syllogism in scripture, then you are correct. But anyone that has studied logic knows that there are many arguments which are stated implicitly.
That they are used is not the same as endorsing them or, more importantly, saying that they are fundamental, ontologically or epistemologically, which is implied in the idea of "objective reason," of some reason that exists apart from minds. Yes, reasons are given and they may more or less follow what are now 'established' logical forms, but that doesn't establish that we are to study logic/objective reason or account for its ontological status. Most importantly, and the point I'm trying to emphasize, it does not establish that logic is "objective" or that logic as "objective" is what we are to seek.
"So I would say that it is in these verses listed above, and in many other places where scripture values "reason" and objectivity. For if these arguments hold any sway they must be anchored into some objective, unchanging framework."
Why? What if logical rules are simply one non-fundamental way of talking about reality? For example, what if it is possible to describe and talk about the world (or, more broadly, about existence) through logic, including the implied notion of properties (and perhaps in terms of substances), but it is also possible to talk about it in other terms?
Kevin,
What exactly do you mean by "established". Sure, Christ, or even Adam and Eve didn't have a Logic textbook. But the point is that Logic permeates every aspect of life. In order for you to even argue your point you assume the law of non-contradiction. You can't be right and not right at the same time in the same way. Even if the laws/rules of logic were never established that would not negate their existence. So to say that these sorts of things are foreign to the Bible is to miss the mark.
And sure it is possible to talk about the world through other legitimate means. But as the old saying goes, "don't throw the baby out with the bathwater." Further, if there are other ways of talking about reality (I am curious to know what you mean by this statement), these ways should be seen as complementary to already accepted methodology.
Kevin,
If you thought your post was long, you should see the one that I spent an hour writing this evening ... only to lose it as my wireless connection died. So you will, mercifully, be treated to the shorter version here.
First, let’s clear the relatively minor issues out of the way, not in the sense of settling our disagreements (I’m not that optimistic!) but in the sense of locating them so that we can come back to them later with a sense of where they lie.
Yes, Scripture teaches us to value objective reason -- but I think you’re misunderstanding what I mean by that term. Certainly, as Clint has pointed out, it is possible for Scripture to teach us the value of reasoning without its deploying a highly developed analytical apparatus. More on that anon.
On Job: a narrative structure and the free use of rhetorical questions is not incompatible with the giving of cogent reasons. You misunderstood my reference to “who God is,” reading it as an ontologically abstract claim about what God is. That was not my point. (Nor was it God’s.)
On Proverbs: “taste” is only the meaning of the root from which ta’am is derived etymologically. In context, it would make nonsense of the proverb to try to read the word that way. Seven men who can render a taste?!
On Paul: Acts 26:26 makes no sense except as a reference to the well-attested public fact of the resurrection. Paul is clearly indicating that he believes Agrippa himself is aware of the attestation.
On Peter: the meaning of the term apologia in secular Greek literature is well documented: it refers to a reasoned legal defense. The history of later Latin translations of logos isn’t really germane to this point.
Okay, now for the big stuff.
Most of what you’ve said here about logic and mathematics is false. When corrected, it doesn’t lend any support to the views you are trying to advance. And most of what you say about objective reason that isn’t bound up with your critique of logic is a caricature of the understanding of reason -- both in the Analytic tradition and in the Enlightenment.
If I thought you were a blowhard, or if you didn’t care to interact on these things, I wouldn’t take the time to go line by line through what you’ve said on these topics. After all, continental philosophers as a group aren’t exactly famous for their firm grasp of logic and mathematics. But you are obviously bright (I mean this sincerely), and it’s clear that what you’ve given us here is, in outline, what you were taught. And that pushes my buttons, since logic and the foundations of mathematics are within my professional speciality.
You write:
Reason has shown its limits on a number of occasions, for example Godel's incompleteness theorem that uses logic itself to demonstrate that logic is incomplete, Russell's Paradox that showed that set theory was incomplete using set theory, etc.
Both of these references are mistaken. Gödel’s incompleteness theorem uses logic to show that any axiomatization of elementary mathematics will be incomplete in a certain sense, but it does not show that “logic itself” is incomplete. Russell’s paradox shows that a certain naive way of construing the conditions for set membership is inconsistent; nothing more.
You express your views on what objective reason amounts to, quoting me (bold) and then responding (italics):
"Surely one needn’t wedge this into a highly specific philosophical framework in order to take from it the idea of something with probative force – for otherwise, whence the contrast with the fool who is wise in his own conceit? And that is sufficient for the contrast between us, where you are inveighing against reasons that have “force” and I am all for them."
Not quite: your use of "reason," especially when we add the idea of "objective" (however that is interpreted in this case), has the implication of a formal system that structures literally everything--thought, creation, possibility, etc. This is quite a step from what is a "highly specific philosophical framework" to a more 'common' notion that the scriptural authors might have used, implying as it does many metaphysical notions that are not given a voice in the scriptural text (some form of atomism, the substance/property metaphysic, the immaterial existence of properties, etc.).
Just about every piece of your reply here is misleading or false:
You have completely misunderstood what I’m talking about. “Objective reason” does not “have the implication” of a formal system; formalization is an attempt to capture something that already exists independent of the formalization. All existing (worthwhile) formalizations of logic capture some cogent inferences and fail to capture others.
A formal system does not structure “literally everything.” Anyone who has worked with formal systems knows this. There are certain inviolable conditions of intelligibility, but these conditions hold independent of anyone’s attempt to formalize them.
Formal logic in its contemporary form does not carry the metaphysical implication of some form of atomism, and it does not (though some forms of the older Aristotelian logic do) presuppose a substance/property metaphysics. I don’t even know what you mean to be claiming when you say that it implies the notion of the immaterial existence of properties.
Again, you quote me (bold) and then respond (italics):
"What we learn in a logic class, when it’s a good class, is how to recognize such reasons and distinguish them from counterfeits."
And the exact nature of the 'distinguishing' has been an open debate in logic for some time, even by good analytic philosophers. For example: is logic both complete and coherent? If Godel is right, any closed system cannot be both: if it is complete then there is a claim that can be given that contradicts another claim (and you can prove anything from a contradiction); if it is coherent then there is a statement that can be given that, while true, cannot be proved within that system.
By “coherent” I assume you mean “consistent.” Gödel does not show that “any closed system cannot be both.” He could not. It’s well known that classical bivalent propositional logic and first order predicate calculus are both consistent and complete.
We can add to this the fact that you cannot derive second order logic from first order logic ...
Do you mean that you cannot quantify over predicates in a system where quantifying over predicates isn’t allowed? Okay ...
... and there are propositions one can make within that one cannot make in the other, ...
By “propositions” I assume you mean “sentences” here. Presumably you have in mind the ones where you quantify over predicates, which you can’t do in a system where quantifying over predicates isn’t defined. Okay ...
and the tyrany of the logical proposition is put into question.
Huh?!
This isn't so-called 'postmodern' stuff, but conclusions reached (or questions left unresolved) by thoroughly analytic thinkers.
No, actually, I’m afraid it is postmodern stuff -- the folklore that passes in postmodern circles for the truth about logic.
Tim,
I'm trying to be careful and considerate in my response, so it will take a little longer to get to it (not to mention that I also have about 5 other projects on my plate). But thank you for taking the time to respond.
Kevin,
No problem. I understand -- do I ever! -- about having other projects on your plate. Take your time.
If this is inappropriate here, please let me know. Someone has started up a Being and Time reading blog for this summer. For those who want to learn more about Heidegger's thought and interact with those who have more than a passing interest (and more than a single class's reading), it is open to anyone.
Tim,
You don't have an email address on Blogger and, not knowing any other way of contacting you, thought I'd ask here: I've set up the groundwork for addressing your question about the ontological nature of logic here. There Clark asked a question about what the claim that "logic is ontologically fundamental" means. Could you please pop on in and give us some thoughts?
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