tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post115933585672150150..comments2024-03-25T19:00:40.046-06:00Comments on The Constructive Curmudgeon: Modus Ponens and Modus Tolens in the Materialism/Dualism DebateDouglas Groothuis, Ph.D.http://www.blogger.com/profile/08766692378954258034noreply@blogger.comBlogger8125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post-1159577786421417782006-09-29T18:56:00.000-06:002006-09-29T18:56:00.000-06:00Your ASA argument is logically sound. I would add...Your ASA argument is logically sound. I would add though that one could argue that there are nonphysical properties found in higher animals i.e. minds capable of feelings and some reasoning capacity albeit, obviously at a lesser level than humans. The emergent property argument leaves much to be desired.William Bradfordhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/15738364356574554485noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post-1159394122248887352006-09-27T15:55:00.000-06:002006-09-27T15:55:00.000-06:00John,In relation to your post, I'm not only questi...John,<BR/><BR/>In relation to your post, I'm not only questioning the usefulness of an 'immaterial' entity, but I'm also denying that reductivistic 'physicalism'--understanding the human mode of being through the currently fashionable view of 'matter' (however outdated from physics' perspective; philosophy is always behind physics in these things)--is adequate. What is needed is a new vocabulary for describing our active embodiment that informs and makes possible our most abstract thought.Kevin Wintershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14702922698859174212noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post-1159379746625139312006-09-27T11:55:00.000-06:002006-09-27T11:55:00.000-06:00All forms of naturalism that I am aware of hold as...All forms of naturalism that I am aware of hold as a presupposition that materialism is true for the sake of scientific discovery. Therefore, we are told, naturalistic evolution is true. I believe you correctly parse the syllogism. The argumentation we are fed by the naturalists, therefore, is the fallacy of affirming the consequent.Jim Pembertonhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/01446388434272680014noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post-1159372495823315592006-09-27T09:54:00.000-06:002006-09-27T09:54:00.000-06:00Forgive me for thinking out loud, but lately I've ...Forgive me for thinking out loud, but lately I've been trying to get a grasp of exactly what "thought" is meant to entail when it is used as you use it: what is thought? Can it really be described as immaterial, or as having no location or spatial context? Even mathematics, with all its abstractions, requires space: that terms are spatially related (they are written from "left" to "right," terms can be "trans"-itive, etc.), that they are symbolized (symbols are spatial in nature, as it is by their spatiality that we identify them), even that they require the discipline of mathematics with all its practical foundations (adding and subtracting objects, paying the rent, etc.). If we are to claim that thought is indeed immaterial, content needs to be given both to "thought" itself and what exactly "immateriality" adds (other than merely claiming that it is not the currently fashionable understanding of "matter," which, as a negative term, is really contentless).Kevin Wintershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14702922698859174212noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post-1159366912736237992006-09-27T08:21:00.000-06:002006-09-27T08:21:00.000-06:00As two illustrations of my thoughts, see here and ...As two illustrations of my thoughts, see <A HREF="http://socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/188_s05/pdf/Charles_Taylor_Background.pdf" REL="nofollow">here</A> and <A HREF="http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/188_s05/pdf/Carman_Body.pdf" REL="nofollow">here</A>.Kevin Wintershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14702922698859174212noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post-1159365697808704632006-09-27T08:01:00.000-06:002006-09-27T08:01:00.000-06:00But what is thought? Is it the organization of pro...But what is thought? Is it the organization of propositions? If so, then how do those propositions come about or gain their meaning? In the end you must essentially include active embodied being as a ground upon which thought itself is possible. I could also raise the question of why we must understand "matter" in reductionistic terms (beyond that it is currently philosophical tradition to do so): our body certainly isn't mere matter.Kevin Wintershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14702922698859174212noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post-1159365411443402032006-09-27T07:56:00.000-06:002006-09-27T07:56:00.000-06:00Thought is not reducible to matter. Propositional ...Thought is not reducible to matter. Propositional thoughts are true or false; matter is not true or false, etc.Douglas Groothuis, Ph.D.https://www.blogger.com/profile/08766692378954258034noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post-1159363176142528822006-09-27T07:19:00.000-06:002006-09-27T07:19:00.000-06:00This will not be surprising to you, but what nonph...This will not be surprising to you, but what nonphysical properties do humans have? It seems that every indication of something supposedly non-physical is so tied to space and embodiment as to be unnecessary, superfluous.Kevin Wintershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14702922698859174212noreply@blogger.com