tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post115091281469882967..comments2024-03-25T19:00:40.046-06:00Comments on The Constructive Curmudgeon: "Above All Earthly Pow'rs" by David WellsDouglas Groothuis, Ph.D.http://www.blogger.com/profile/08766692378954258034noreply@blogger.comBlogger10125tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post-1151465936281540962006-06-27T21:38:00.000-06:002006-06-27T21:38:00.000-06:00Yes, but it must appear ineffable, so there must b...Yes, but it must appear ineffable, so there must be something positive to it. Without it appearing in such a way, we could not know that it is ineffable, or at least beyond our full comprehension; without that appearing our attribution of ineffability could be arbitrary.<BR/><BR/>For Levinas and Heidegger, the ineffable appears in terms of the excess, or in that which does not appear in every appearing of a being <I>as</I> something (thus, it is 'nothing,' 'no-thing'). To use language that doesn't quite catch the phenomena (but is close enough for our purposes), a baseball bat could appear as something to use in a baseball game, but it can also appear as a piece of art (say for the Baseball Hall of Fame), or as a weapon to protect oneself against an intruder, or as a door stop, or as a hammer, or as a trophy, or any other possibly limitless ways.<BR/><BR/>For Levinas, God and people are the same: no matter how many propositions we can amass, no matter how many stories we can tell or how long we've known someone, there is an excess: they can still surprise us, there are still things we do not know, things that escape our current attributions. Yes, my wife <B>is</B> a woman, she <B>is</B> a student, she <B>is</B> a daughter, she <B>is</B> beautiful, she <B>is</B> impatient on occasion, she <B>is</B> loving, and on and on and on. Hence, she escapes full disclosure, she are literally transcendent--no matter how long I go on describing her, whether in terms of properties or narratives, there is always more that can be said.<BR/><BR/>If Heidegger is right in what I wrote above, then objects likewise are transcendent: it really is impossible to catalog all the ways that any given object can appear. This, incidentally, is also one of the driving points of deconstruction--any given text will of necessity leave things about, not because of mere ignorance, but due do the very excess that is being. It is because we love the 'thing itself' in all its excess/transcendence that we deconstruct texts that attempt to pigeonhole the thing into its theoretical constructs. It is not that such pigeonholing does not reveal some aspect of the being, as it truly does, but that any such revelation is essentially finite.<BR/><BR/>Of course, the above is meaningless without some form of realism, hence Heidegger(and Derrida) is a postmodern realist (if you wish to use those terms). If the above is correct, Heidegger), as one of the "secular postmodernists" who has had tremendous "influence," cannot be included in Wells' generalizations. This would also include Derrida.Kevin Wintershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14702922698859174212noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post-1151461085968570222006-06-27T20:18:00.000-06:002006-06-27T20:18:00.000-06:00If you think (for some reason or no reason) that s...If you think (for some reason or no reason) that something is ineffable, then the only sensible thing to do is shut up, since nothing can be said about it.Douglas Groothuis, Ph.D.https://www.blogger.com/profile/08766692378954258034noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post-1151420250406270112006-06-27T08:57:00.000-06:002006-06-27T08:57:00.000-06:00Those are not quite similar cases: Craig and Morel...Those are not quite similar cases: Craig and Moreland are both dealing in a world that explicitly claims that words capture (or describes) something's essence. But when the phenomena (or, perhaps, anti-phenomena) is pre-linguistic, how can you talk about it without thereby destroying its essence? If, as Plato claimed, the Good is 'beyond essence' (one of the prime sources of inspiration for Levinas), then how can we speak of it? That is the difficulty. It's not an issue of the difficult of the subject discussed, but the essence of the thing itself.<BR/><BR/>Beyond that, however, there are some very good secondary sources on Levinas' thought, primary among them being the work of Adriaan Peperzak. <A HREF="http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0268013144/qid=1151419842/sr=1-1/ref=sr_1_1/104-8019109-9353558?s=books&v=glance&n=283155" REL="nofollow">Colin Davis' introductory work</A> is also quite good.Kevin Wintershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14702922698859174212noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post-1151389487187715332006-06-27T00:24:00.000-06:002006-06-27T00:24:00.000-06:00Difficult subjects can be written about clearly: c...Difficult subjects can be written about clearly: consider the kalam cosmological argument as it is handled by Bill Craig or the argument from mind by JP Moreland or the ontological argument discussed by Stephen T. Davis.Douglas Groothuis, Ph.D.https://www.blogger.com/profile/08766692378954258034noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post-1151207079252257432006-06-24T21:44:00.000-06:002006-06-24T21:44:00.000-06:00Oh, and as for Marion and Levinas, there's a good ...Oh, and as for Marion and Levinas, there's a good reason for their obscurity (something shared by the later Heidegger): when you are trying to discuss that which is prior to every saying or proposition, it's hard to put it into words without destroying its essence. But I imagine that is for another time.Kevin Wintershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14702922698859174212noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post-1151206877023978772006-06-24T21:41:00.000-06:002006-06-24T21:41:00.000-06:00Well, Derrida was a realist (see also here; decons...Well, <A HREF="http://www.jcrt.org/archives/01.3/index.html?page=caputo.shtml" REL="nofollow">Derrida was a realist</A> (see also <A HREF="http://jamesfaulconer.byu.edu/deconstr.htm" REL="nofollow">here</A>; deconstruction itself is meaningless without some form of realism), and <A HREF="http://ist-socrates.berkeley.edu/~hdreyfus/html/paper_being.html" REL="nofollow">Foucault was a realist</A>, and, from my own familiarity with him, Heidegger was a realist (some interpret him as an idealist, but even they admit that they are in the minority). I would wager to say that Nietsche was a realist, from some of the recent work I've been reading. Therefore, at least two of the individuals that you have already said are 'postmodern,' and possibly four of them, were realists. Hence, I'm very skeptical of your claim.Kevin Wintershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14702922698859174212noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post-1151188939433558652006-06-24T16:42:00.000-06:002006-06-24T16:42:00.000-06:00SK is no postmodernist! He was a realist, but a fi...SK is no postmodernist! He was a realist, but a fideist of a sort. Wells deals with secular postmodernists mostly, who have the most influence. Marion and Levinas are extremely obscure.Douglas Groothuis, Ph.D.https://www.blogger.com/profile/08766692378954258034noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post-1150990264507705792006-06-22T09:31:00.000-06:002006-06-22T09:31:00.000-06:00In relation to the same quote Jonathan gave, what ...In relation to the same quote Jonathan gave, what on earth can wells say to those so-called postmoderns like Levinas and Marion who most certainly cannot be described in these supposedly 'eros' terms? Or perhaps Kierkegaard, the Father of Existentialism, who has been drawn on by many so-called postmodernists, for whom God's authority trumped every reason, every attempt at man to 'prove' God's existence or the 'objective' validity of scripture?<BR/><BR/>It seems that Wells is under the same illusion that any postmodernist necessarily eschews authority, is inherently atheistic, and sees nothing correct about our human condition.Kevin Wintershttps://www.blogger.com/profile/14702922698859174212noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post-1150924207240307862006-06-21T15:10:00.000-06:002006-06-21T15:10:00.000-06:00Wells draw out the distinctions nicely. Read the b...Wells draw out the distinctions nicely. Read the book.Douglas Groothuis, Ph.D.https://www.blogger.com/profile/08766692378954258034noreply@blogger.comtag:blogger.com,1999:blog-14410967.post-1150918078550700192006-06-21T13:27:00.000-06:002006-06-21T13:27:00.000-06:00Doug,I agree with the general critique of our cult...Doug,<BR/><BR/>I agree with the general critique of our culture. But, what tends to irritate me is the implication that some of these general spiritual concerns for mankind are labeled as uniquely "postmodern" (whatever that is!).<BR/><BR/>For example, here is a quote...<BR/><I>Postmodern spirituality, Wells argues, is eros spirituality, in Nygren’s sense. It views human nature itself as a mediator of the sacred, as unfallen and basically good, and without need of an ultimate Authority beyond itself.</I><BR/><BR/>Doug, how does this differ, dramatically, from so-called Modern and rationalistic optimism? The above description is not a uniquely postmodern problem, it is a <I>human</I> problem. Kierkegaard rambled about similar things in reaction to Hegel and others who were definately not "postmodern." Does Wells wish we could go back to the good ole' days? As if there were no problems with bucking the Authority of God in Modern days?<BR/><BR/>Every culture and generation buries the transcendent God in a rubble of worthless idols. Better philosophy or better doctrine or better theology gets an individual no closer to the person of Christ.Jonathan Erdmanhttps://www.blogger.com/profile/04234688186113838474noreply@blogger.com